Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Ontological Commitment: A theory is bound to the acceptance of objects if it were wrong without the existence of these objects. It may be, however, that parts of the theory do not have to contain the object, then the ontological commitment for the whole theory is omitted. (See H. Lauener Quine, 1982, p. 130)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Ontological Commitment - Dictionary of Arguments
Lauener XI 130 Ontological Commitment/Quine/Lauener: only exists when an object is common to all differently re-interpreted domains - (while retaining the interpretation of the predicates) - the theory only presupposes objects if it would be wrong if the objects did not exist - E.g. "objects of any kind whatsoever": here one is commited to dogs if each of the domains contains one or the other dog. XI 48 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: substitutional quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: precisely with this we disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 133 Ontology/Modality/LauenerVsQuine: it is noticeable that in its formulations occur intensional expressions such as "must occur among the values of the variables", "must be true of" etc. Or psychological connotations such as "we look at". ChurchVsQuine: the expression "ontological commitment" is intentional. (>Intensions). XI 158 Ontology/ontological obligation/Quine/Lauener: Lauener: unsolved problem: the relationship between ontological obligation and ontology. For example, two modern chemical theories, one implies the existence of molecules with a certain structure, the other denies them. Question: do they have the same ontology despite different commitments? Quine/Lauener: would probably say yes and say that one of the two theories must be wrong. ((s) Then they have rather the same obligation than the same ontology). LauenerVsQuine: my attempts to solve these problems make me believe that not only the quantified variables (with the objects) but also the predicates play a role. Quine VII (a) 12 Ontology: the bound variable is the only way to impose ontological obligations on us. Example: we can already say that it is something (namely the value of the bound variables) that red houses and sunsets have in common._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Ontological Commitment
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29